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In 1968, California ecologist Garrett Hardin wrote "[p]erhaps the most
influential article ever written in the environmental field," 1 a short essay for
Science magazine entitled The Tragedy of the Commons.2 He called for
international cooperation to reduce world population growth and analogized
the environmental problem to the inevitable failure of peasants to prevent
overgrazing of common lands.
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the
commons.
. . . Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he
asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my
herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.3
The positive component is the benefit to the individual peasant from grazing
one additional animal. The negative component is the reduction in grass
available to feed his other animals. But since "the effects of overgrazing are
shared by all the herdsmen,"' the negative component as measured by any
given herdsman is overshadowed by the positive benefit to him of grazing an
additional animal.
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that
tFred P. Bosselman graduated from the Harvard Law School in 1959 and practiced law in
Chicago and Boca Raton from 1959 to 1991, most recently with the firm of Burke, Bosselman
and Weaver. He is now Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent Law School where he teaches energy,
environmental, and land use law. His most recent article, Limitations Inherent in the Title to
Wetlands at Common Law, which will appear in a forthcoming issue of the Stanford Environmental
Law Review, examines ways in which common-pool resources were allocated under the English
common law.
1. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 39 (2d ed. 1994).
2. GarrettHardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). The summary
of Hardin's work given here does not begin to do justice to the complexity and thoughtfulness
of his argument.
3. Id. at 1244.
4. Id.
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compels him to increase his herd.without limit-in a world that is
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all.'
From his parable, Hardin drew the conclusion that we must "explicitly
exorcise" the "invisible hand" when dealing with problems involving
commons. Conscience would not be enough; coercive measures would be
required.'
Few metaphorical creatures have had the rhetorical force of Hardin's
poor peasants and their cattle. Most of the popular environmental law
casebooks quote at length from Hardin's essay' and, like many law teachers,
I have frequently used it to introduce basic concepts of environmental law.
Recently I realized with some embarrassment that I had never bothered to ask
whether anyone had actually checked the health of cows that graze on common
lands. I had simply assumed that the facts supported Hardin's seemingly
unexceptionable thesis.
Yet Hardin's thesis has been challenged by recent studies of the
management of ancient English common lands. These studies question whether
the enclosure of common lands increased overall efficiency, as had long been
assumed, and suggest instead that pre-enclosure management of common lands
may have been much more efficient than previously believed.9 Model building
experiments have raised similar questions about whether the medieval
commons were the economic disaster postulated by Hardin's essay.'"
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1246-47. Hardin recommended that coercion be achieved by democratic means,
"mutually agreed upon by the majority of people affected." Id. at 1247. Classical economic theory
advocates the privatization of common property as a means of avoiding the kind of problems that
Hardin describes. See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY,
THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 105-106 (1994).
8. See, e.g., FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY 20-25 (2d ed. 1990); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTALREGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 42-44 (1992); ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTALLAW AND
POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 34-39 (1992).
9. See CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION (1980); J.M. NEESON, COMMONERS: COMMON RIGHT,
ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1700-1820 (1993); Robert C. Allen, The
Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures, 92 ECON. J. 937
(1982); Bennett Baack, Testing the Impact of Exclusive Property Rights: The Case of Enclosing
Common Fields, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
DOUGLASS C. NORTH 257, 262-63 (Roger L. Ransom et al. eds., 1982); Susan Jane Buck Cox,
No Tragedy on the Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 49 (1985).
10. See Bruce A. Larson & Daniel W. Bromley, Property Rights, Externalities, and
Resource Degradation: Locating the Tragedy, 33 J. DEV. ECON. 235 (1990); Carlisle Ford Runge,
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But the value of Hardin's thesis rests not in the historical accuracy of the
metaphor but in the logic of his reasoning, which can be tested in its modern
application. In the last decade, however, as researchers have begun to study
commonly-owned property more carefully, they have found a lot of fat and
happy cattle (and their symbolic equivalents) grazing on commons. Was Hardin
wrong?
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (hereinafter Rules/Games)
by Elinor Ostrom and various co-authors, is a progress report on the efforts
of scholars in a variety of fields to explain how the management of common
lands actually works." It follows Ostrom's earlier book, Governing the
Commons, 2 and I hope that it will be followed in its turn by further and
equally helpful reports on her ongoing research into common property
management. 3
This essay will first summarize the methodology and conclusions of
Rules/Games, then discuss how the book fits with other ongoing research into
common property issues, and finish by offering some comments on the
potential usefulness of the various research methodologies employed.
I. Methodology and Conclusions
In Rules/Games, the authors use both field studies and classroom
simulations to test the hypotheses advanced in Ostrom's 1990 book. Part One
of Rules/Games describes the problem of what Ostrom calls "common-pool
resources," a term possibly designed to avoid introducing property concepts
into the definition of the resource. After describing a few typical examples of
overused resources, she describes the methodology of the overall study in a
traditional policy analysis framework, 4 and provides some basic explanations
of the hypotheses she plans to test through game simulations.
Part Two describes the game simulations, which used as subjects students
enrolled in introductory economics at Indiana University. 5 The students were
asked to decide how much to spend to exploit a depletable resource as they
Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional
Grazing Context, 63 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 595 (1981), see also Brian R. Binger & Elizabeth
Hoffman, Institutional Persistence and Change: The Question of Efficiency, 145 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL EcON. 67, 75-80 (1989) (questioning assumption that institutional evolution is
necessarily efficiency enhancing).
11. ELINOR OSTROM Er AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994).
12. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
13. Other publications by Ostrom and her colleagues include Edella Schlager & Elinor
Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON.
249 (1992).
14. OSTROM, supra note II, at 23-50.
15. Id. at 106.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
observed data on repeated iterations of the aggregate expenditures of all of the
students on such exploitation.
6
Even in the simplest versions of these simulations, game theory failed
to predict the simulations' "disequilibrium results." 7 In more complex
versions, the most common divergence from theory was the tendency of the
students to cooperate when theory suggested they would do otherwise.
Assuming that individuals perceive the game as we have
operationalized it in the laboratory setting, the subgame consistent
equilibrium prediction for one-shot and repeated communication is
the same as that for a finitely repeated constituent game without
communication. Communication in any form should not make a
difference, but it does. Repeating the opportunity for 'mere
jawboning' should not yield different results than one-shot
communication, but it does. If communication were simply being
used to agree upon a joint strategy, then one round of
communication should suffice. Once individuals have made an
agreement in the lab, much of the time spent communicating is
devoted to establishing trust and verbally chastising unknown
individuals if agreements are broken. These activities, when not
backed up by enforceable agreements, do not yet play a theoretical
role in explaining results within noncooperative game theory. 8
The authors were obviously frustrated with the students' failure to act
as game theory predicted they would, 9 but the description of the simulations
occupies 172 pages and provides useful reading for those who wish to
determine how much credibility to attach to theories derived from such
studies .2' The authors conclude that the predictions of game theory are
"supported, at least at an aggregate level" in "many" of the settings studied,
but that the research encountered "anomalies" that required rethinking the
game theory hypotheses that were used. 2' The support for game theory was
found in "situations that most closely approximate a barren institutional setting
16. Id. at 106-08.
17. Id. at 121.
18. Id. at 197. (It grieves me to quote a sentence that uses the word "operationalized,"
but the quoted paragraph concisely summarizes the key finding of Ostrom's game simulations.)
19. By this time, so many college students throughout the country have been employed
as pawns in mock interactions that it must be difficult to find subjects who lack preconceived
strategies.
20. Id. at 51-223.
21. Id. at 21. One of the most valuable skills in academia is the ability to describe
completed research in a way that honestly exposes its lack of success while demonstrating that
at least one more grant is justified to pursue the work.
Vol. 13:391, 1996
Bosselman Book Review
involving no capacity to make binding agreements as well as no capacity to
communicate. Even in these environments, however, behavior at an individual
level did not conform to theoretical predictions and did not appear to settle
down to an equilibrium." 22
Ostrom points out that many other researchers also have found that
people in these simulations cooperate more than game theorists would have
predicted.23 And although she believes it is premature to suggest how
communication among the participants induces such cooperation, her overall
conclusions from both the field studies and the simulations have convinced her
of the importance of such communication.24
Part Three of the book consists of field studies conducted by the authors
themselves and of analyses of other research regarding common-pool
resources. Shui Yan Tang, the author of the chapter on irrigation systems,
updates his earlier research' that made use of forty-seven separate studies
of irrigation systems in thirteen different countries.26 The chapter on coastal
fisheries, by Edella Schlager, covers thirty case studies from sixteen
countries."
Arun Agrawal's chapter on community forests in India is more site-
specific.28 He reviews rulemaking, monitoring, sanctioning, and arbitration
practices in six different Indian villages where community forests are being
used. In the final field study chapter, William Blomquist updates his earlier
work29 on the regulation of groundwater basins in Southern California.3" The
summaries of the field work are clearly and concisely written using a common
framework of terminology and analysis. The high quality of this coordinated
research is a testimony to the teamwork established by Ostrom's workshop at
Indiana University.31
The authors' overall conclusions in Part Four derive primarily from their
analysis of the field studies rather than the game simulations. The authors
conclude that certain rules seem to be essential to the optimal management of
common property resources. First and foremost is the existence of strict limits
on the number of persons who may use the resource. These "boundary rules"
22. Id. at 218-19.
23. Id. at 168.
24. Id. at 168-69, 197-99, 322-27.
25. SHUI YAN TANG, INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: SELF-GOVERNANCE IN
IRRIGATION (1992).
26. OSTROM, supra note 11, at 243-45.
27. Id. at 255-56.
28. Id. at 267-82.
29. WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).
30. OSTROM, supra note 11, at 283-300.
31. The authors are all participants in the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy
Analysis at the Indiana University at Bloomington.
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exist in all successful systems of common property management, although the
rules are not always formally adopted.32
In a sense, therefore, Ostrom's study confirms the logic behind Hardin's
theory while rejecting the appropriateness of his specific metaphor. Hardin
hypothesized a commons "open to all" on which an unlimited number of
English peasants could graze an unlimited number of cattle. Historically,
however, such a commons never existed. Under the common law, the right
to graze cattle on the common was limited to individuals who had actual
grants33 or prescriptive servitudes,34 and to the residents of a locality who
by custom had traditionally grazed their cattle there in the past.35
Furthermore, people's ability to move from one English rural community to
another was also limited by both practical and legal restrictions.36
Ostrom and her co-authors also emphasize that rules promoting internal
communication among resource users are a key element in the development
and maintenance of successful common-property management systems. Such
communication makes it possible for users informally to monitor and enforce
rules for the utilization of the resource.37 The results of the game simulations
reinforce this conclusion by suggesting that communication can be far more
effective than traditional game theory would predict.3"
More tentatively, the authors identify two characteristics of common-
property resources that can be most successfully managed: (1) resources that
are stationary rather than mobile;39 and (2) resources that, can be stored,
rather than having to be used at once or lost.4 For example, water in an
underground basin is both stationary and subject to being stored, while
migratory fish in an ocean are much more mobile and difficult to store.
Stationary resources can more easily be limited to users within a particular
geographic area, thus underscoring the importance of boundary limits noted
earlier. The ability to store the resource apparently makes it easier to devise
acceptable methods of allocating rights among a group of users whose access
32. OSTROM, supra note 11, at 302-04.
33. See THOMAS E. SCRUTrON, COMMONS AND COMMON FIELDS 41 (Cambridge
University Press 1887).
34. See NEESON, supra note 9, at 64-65.
35. See THOMAS H. CARSON, PRESCRIPTION AND CUSTOM 93-96 (1907), see generally
Albert Kiralfy, Custom in Medieval Law, 9 J. LEG. HIST. 26 (1988); Andrea C. Loux, The
Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and the Common Law in the Nineteenth
Century, 79 CORN. L. REV. 183 (1993).
36. Only in the years following the great plagues was there any significant geographical
mobility among the English rural population. See J.L. BOLTON, THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH
ECONOMY, 1150-1500 at 236 (1980).
37. OSTROM, supra note 11, at 302-03.
38. See supra notes 17-22, and accompanying text.
39. OSTROM, supra note 11, at 308-12.
40. Id. at 312-14.
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to the resource may vary over time.
II. Other Research
Ostrom's study of common-pool resources draws on a growing body of
empirical research into current conditions in countries where common lands
are the norm. 4 In the 1980s, the institutions that finance development and
conservation activities in third world countries began to express interest in
these research results. Many of these countries had traditionally relied on
common land as an important element in the local economy. Attempts by
outside institutions to intervene in these countries without understanding the
existing systems by which common lands were managed sometimes proved
counterproductive.42
In 1985, the National Research Council of the National Academies of
Science and Engineering brought together a Panel on Common Property
Resource Management to "assess systematically differing institutional
arrangements for the effective conservation and utilization of jointly managed
resources." 4" The participants looked not only at common lands but water
resources and "other jointly held resources that constitute the global
commons."' Ostrom's work on that panel was the foundation for her
continuing research. 4"
When Ostrom began her research into common-pool resources, she found
that scholars from many disciplines had been studying the management of such
resources with little awareness of similar work that was taking place in other
fields.' In preparing her 1990 book, Ostrom looked at hundreds of such
studies and formulated some tentative hypotheses for identifying successful
common property management systems.47
The timeliness of this research is particularly apparent as we witness the
41. See, e.g., PIERS BLAIKIE &HAROLD BROOKFIELD, LAND DEGRADATION AND SOCIETY
(1987); DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (1989); COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: ECOLOGY AND
COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Firket Berkes ed., 1989); THE QUESTION OF
THE COMMONS (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987); Jeffrey A. McNeely,
Common Property Resource Management or Government Ownership: Improving the Conservation
of Biological Resources, 10 INT'L REL. 211 (1991).
42. For a vivid example, see Richard Moorehead, Changes Taking Place in Common-
Property Resource Management in the Inland Niger Delta of Mali, in COMMON PROPERTY
RESOURCES, supra note 41, at 256.
43. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON COMMON
PROPERTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT vii (1985).
44. Id.
45. Elinor Ostrum, Issues of Definition and Theory: Some Conclusions and Hypotheses,
in Id. at 597.
46. See OSTROM, supra note 12, at xiii.
47. Id. at 91-103.
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breakdown of many common resource systems. For example, the rapid and
continuing decline in the world's ocean fisheries is causing violent
confrontations among otherwise peaceful countries," and in places like
Albania,49 the depletion of agricultural resources is contributing to famine
and mass migration.
Legal scholars are gradually beginning to realize the valuable implications
of multidisciplinary research into common property resource management.
Some of the early legal research addressed the issue of common rights to land
and water under the English common law and the potential application of these
common law concepts to modern problems.5" In addition, studies like Robert
Ellickson's Order Without Law have focused on the ways in which cohesive
groups are able to manage potential property-right conflicts through the
development of informal norms. 5 Like Ostrom's work, some of these studies
conclude that success is achievable by a well-defined user group that anticipates
its own permanence and develops good internal communication abilities.5 2
Most scholars who have analyzed these empirical studies have found no
reliable correlation between any particular property rights regime and the
maintenance of sustainable resources.
Outside of academia, procedural changes in legal systems parallel the
research results. Proposals that stress the importance of the participation of
well-defined interest groups in negotiated rulemaking involve a similar
48. See Barbara Crossette, Treaty Proposal to Curtail Overfishing is Approved at U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1995, at A5; Don't Eat the Seahorses, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 1995,
at 98 ("Cod, haddock, halibut, salmon, shark, swordfish, red snapper, orange roughie, summer
flounder, yellowtail flounder, bluefin tuna-fishery after fishery has collapsed in the past
decade. ").
49. See Owen Bowcott, A Country Free for Freebooters, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 1, 1995,
at 5.
50. See Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern
Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 835 (1982); S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop,
'Common Property 'asa Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975);
Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James B. Wadley, The Common Lands Concept: A "Commons"
Solution to a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 361 (1974). More recently,
Carol Rose's studies of common rights in land and water have been particularly influential. E.g.,
Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of
Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990). These have been reprinted and
updated in ROSE, supra note 7. See also Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the
Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1, 26-27 (1994) [hereinafter Given-ness and Gift].
51. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES
(1991).
52. See Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model
of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 215 (1994).
53. See Firket Berkes et al., The Benefits of the Commons, 340 NATURE 91, 93 (1989).
An article I have found especially valuable for introducing law students to commons concepts is
Carol Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,
40 DUKE L.J. 1 (1991).
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emphasis on clearly-bounded group participation. 4 And dispute resolution
mechanisms that train facilitators to encourage informal communication among
potential adversaries within local communities underline the importance of
communication networks in developing and implementing informal norms.5
III. Methodological Utility
Are Ostrom's conclusions convincing? The idea that commons problems
can be solved by cooperation among user groups is appealing, and certainly
deserves both further study and actual experimentation. In an increasingly
impersonal and alienated society, the goal of small group cooperation awakens
nostalgic memories of village cohesion.
But if the communitarian idea is to prove acceptable in the United States,
its compatibility with other basic American values needs to be demonstrated.
Consider, for example, the value of social mobility. Most research suggests
that those user groups that most successfully formulate and enforce informal
norms for the management of common property resources are those groups
that have a high degree of internal cohesion, often through kinship or similar
ties.6 In a mobile and multicultural society, empowerment of such groups
inevitably raises questions about the exclusion of non-members."
And how do we square the power of user groups with our tradition of
individual rights? The legal literature has begun to explore ways of adapting
communitarian institutions to a constitutional system of government that is
54. See, e.g., Lee P. Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The Institutional Challenges
of Ecosystem Management for Lands in Private Ownership, 19 VT. L. REV. 363, 394-421 (1995);
Tom Melling, Bruce Babbitt's Use of Governmental Dispute Resolution: A Mid-Term Report Card,
30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 57 (1995); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-
Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: ime for Something Completely
Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555, 661-71 (1995). A recent critique of negotiated rulemaking
("reg-neg") is Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus versus Incentives: A SkepticalLook at Regulatory
Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994). Cf. Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts
Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 652 (1994) (describing
conditions under which reg-neg most effective).
55. See Patrick Fn'Piere and Linda Work, On the Growth and Development of Dispute
Resolution, 81 KY. L.J. 959 (1992-93) (describing community dispute resolution as a community-
based system that can include mediation, arbitration, conciliation, facilitation, and negotiation);
see also Symposium on Emerging Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems, 81 KY. L. J. 853
(1992-93), including Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution Comes to Kentucky: a Case
Study in Community Mediation, 81 KY. L.J. 855 (1992-93).
56. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 51.
57. Progress in achieving locational mobility for all ethnic groups has been slow at best.
See Judith W. Wegner, Symposium: The Urban Crisis: The Kerner Commission Report Revisited:
Prologue, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1283 (1993). For a recent discussion of the problems posed by
ethnicity on the international level, see DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, PANDEMONIUM: ETHNICITY
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
based on the rights of individuals, but answers do not come easily.5 8
The empowerment of current user groups also raises issues of
intergenerational equity. People in future generations will be users of common-
pool resources in ways yet to be identified. Can we incorporate their needs into
a system of rules based on the preferences of current user groups? 9
The work of Ostrom and other students of common property systems
offers hope that an accommodation among these disparate values can be
accomplished. 60 This work has great potential because many of the most
valued elements of our quality of life, such as the amenities of a neighborhood
or the beauties of nature, can be perceived as common-pool resources. 61 If
we can develop adequate methodologies for managing such resources, there
are many unexplored possibilities for their application.
But some of our most pressing common resource problems involve user
groups that are widespread and ephemeral, or groups whose members are not
even conscious that the group exists.62 In the most extreme example, the user
group may be the entire population of the world, as in the case of the "users"
of biodiversity. 63 And unfortunately, Ostrom's work supports the accuracy
of Hardin's original insight-that the solution of common resource problems
becomes both more difficult and more important as the scale of the resource
grows.
As for Ostrom's game simulation methodology, I am skeptical of the idea
that groups of college students can serve as an accurate microcosm for the
population as a whole, given the tendency of students to band together against
anything that seems like an institutional power structure. But in view of the
authors' field studies suggesting that common property resource management
is most effective when the user group is limited in number and has strong
internal communication skills,'M the students may have been a more
representative sample of successful user groups than might have been expected.
58. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 260-61 (1993);
Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of Identity, 61 U.
Ci. L. REv. 1213, 1239-42 (1994), see also ELLICKSON, supra note 51, at 250-51, 284.
59. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the
Individual Through the Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1739, 1761-
63; Rose, Given-ness and Gift, supra note 50, at 26-27.
60. I have expressed elsewhere the view that our attitudes toward land spring from such
divergent traditions that we can only hope to reach a rough accommodation among them. See Fred
P. Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439,
1510-11 (1994).
61. See Rose, Given-ness and Gift, supra note 50, at 12-13, 25-29.
62. See Lazarus, supra note 59, at 1771-73. One of the most promising experiments in
dealing with such problems is the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. See Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1512,
1542-43 (1992).
63. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 347-49 (1992).
64. See OsTROM, supra note 11, at 324.
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But my difficulties with game simulations go deeper than the choice of
participants, and undoubtedly reflect my own experience. Economists correctly
point out that lawyers have been trained to think inductively. 6' Having spent
over half of my life practicing law, I now realize that much of that time was
spent on what an academic would classify as inductive, empirical, but
nonquantified research-trying to psych out the future behavior patterns of
judges, legislators, my clients' opponents, and so on. Practicing lawyers learn
that people are motivated by a wide range of complex factors, and that
knowing which buttons to push is a skill not reducible to simple theory.
Consequently, my eyes tend to glaze over when I confront descriptions
of methodology that make such claims as "utility theory is a richly developed
body of theory for how individuals assign a valuation-utility-to the outcomes
of costs and actions." 66 People who have real cash on the line don't often
market their products by appeals to "utility" because they understand that
buyers are motivated by appeals to prestige, power, sex, security, or a wide
range of other triggers identified by specialists in motivation research.67 Even
sellers of financial products, for which costs and benefits are readily
quantifiable, such as life insurance or mutual funds, know how to push these
emotional hot buttons.68
It is quite possible that deductive theorists will eventually have more
success understanding human behavior than lawyers and advertising agencies.
Certainly such research is worth pursuing, but I will be skeptical of game
theories until they begin to incorporate the understandings of modern
psychology 69 and biology' 7 When boards of directors regularly hire game
theorists to run companies, I'll know it is time to rethink my attitude.
Despite the attention it lavishes on game theory, Rules/Games is a
65. See Charles K. Rowley & Wayne Brough, The Efficiency of the Common Law: A New
Institutional Economics Perspective, in EFFICIENCY, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC POLICY 103
(Rfidiger Pethig & Ulrich Schlieper eds., 1987).
66. OSTROM, supra note 11, at 33.
67. See, e.g., IRMA ZANDL & RICHARD LEONARD, TARGETING THE TRENDSETTING
CONSUMER (1992). The founder of commercial motivational research has written an entertaining
sketch of his experiences, see ERNEST DICHTER, GETTING MOTIVATED (1979). For a critique from
the consumer group perspective, see MICHAEL F. JACOBSON & LAURIE ANN MAZUR, MARKETING
MADNESS: A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR A CONSUMER SOCIETY (1995).
68. The dramatic growth of the gambling industry illustrates the complexity of human
motivations relating to pure financial products. See Nathan Kogan & Michael A. Wallach, Risk
Taking, in BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSUMERBEHAVIOR 133-140 (Joel B. Cohen
ed., 1972).
69. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note
68.
70. Professor Rodgers has been influential in introducing biological thinking into the legal
discourse. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Myth: Evaluating
Long-Term Environmental Settlements, 29 RICH. L. REV. 567 (1995); William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective
Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25 (1993).
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 13:391, 1996
valuable book, largely because of the inductive conclusions based on the field
studies. Given Ostrom's mastery of the empirical data concerning common-
pool resources, and her creativity in interpreting that data, I am confident that
she and her colleagues will make increasingly valuable contributions to the
study of this important topic as her work progresses.
